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Abstract
The authors develop a search model of venture capital in which the number of successful matches
of entrepreneurs and venture capitalists (VCs) at any moment in time is a function of the number
of entrepreneurs searching for funds, the number of VCs searching for entrepreneurs, and the
number of vacancies posted by each VC. The authors extend the literature by incorporating search
unemployment and they explicitly model the occupational choice of individuals to become
workers or entrepreneurs. Their analysis shows that, in the market equilibrium, the level of advice
VCs offer is inefﬁciently low compared with the social optimum. Furthermore, the number of
vacancies, the level of employment, and the number of potential entrepreneurs are generally either
too low or too high relative to their socially optimal level. Policy to achieve the social optimum
consists of a capital gains subsidy, an employment tax or subsidy, and an investment tax or
subsidy.
JEL classiﬁcation: D82, G18, G24, H21, J64
Bank classiﬁcation: Financial markets; Fiscal policy; Labour markets
Résumé
Les auteurs élaborent un modèle de recherche de capital de risque dans lequel le nombre de
jumelages réussis entre entrepreneurs et sociétés de capital de risque à n’importe quel moment est
fonction du nombre d’entrepreneurs à la recherche de ﬁnancement, du nombre de sociétés de
capital de risque à la recherche d’entrepreneurs et du nombre d’ouvertures dans chacune de ces
sociétés. Les auteurs vont au-delà des études existantes en tenant compte du chômage de
recherche d’emploi et ils modélisent de façon explicite le choix fait par les personnes de devenir
employé ou entrepreneur. Leur analyse montre qu’en situation d’équilibre du marché, le niveau de
conseils offert par la société de capital de risque est trop bas comparativement à l’optimum social.
De plus, le nombre d’ouvertures, le niveau de l’emploi et le nombre d’entrepreneurs potentiels
sont, en général, soit trop bas soit trop élevés par rapport à leur niveau optimal sur le plan social.
Une politique visant l’atteinte de l’optimum social devrait comporter une subvention relative aux
gains en capital, un impôt sur l’emploi ou une subvention à l’emploi, et un impôt sur
l’investissement ou une subvention à l’investissement.
Classiﬁcation JEL : D82, G18, G24, H21, J64
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Marchés ﬁnanciers; Politique budgétaire; Marchés du travail1 Introduction
Venture capitalists (VCs) specialize in screening and monitoring projects in particular indus-
tries, and in ﬁnancing small entrepreneurs in those industries. VCs have become important
providers of capital to small and young ﬁrms, which typically have diﬃculty raising capital
because they have little collateral and operate in an environment fraught with uncertainty
and high risk. Furthermore, entrepreneurs’ lack of business experience places them at higher
risk of failing to turn a good idea into a proﬁtable enterprise. VCs oﬀer valuable advice to
these small and young ﬁrms.
The relationship between entrepreneurs and VCs is subject to informational asymmetries
that can take two forms: adverse selection and moral hazard. Adverse-selection problems
arise when entrepreneurs are better informed about the probability of success of their projects
than are outside investors. In this case, an entrepreneur may have an incentive to hide the
true probability of success. Since investors cannot distinguish between high- and low-quality
projects, all must be oﬀered the same ﬁnancial terms, and an ineﬃcient number of projects
may be funded in the pooling equilibrium. As de Meza and Webb (1987) show, either
too many or too few projects may be funded, depending on the distribution of project types
within the pool. Moral-hazard problems arise when one party to a transaction cannot observe
the actions taken by the other party. An important example of this is when an entrepreneurial
ﬁrm’s outside investors cannot observe the entrepreneur’s eﬀort. Importantly, problems
caused by asymmetric information are less severe in the case of large and established ﬁrms,
because those ﬁrms can use their assets as collateral and can also provide a track record to
outside investors. Small and young ﬁrms have neither collateral nor a track record.
The specialized screening and monitoring abilities of VCs makes them informed investors
and enables them to reduce the agency costs between entrepreneurs and outside investors
(Chan, 1983; Admati and Pﬂeiderer, 1994; Amit, Brander, and Zott, 1998; Casamatta, 2002).
Moreover, the presence of informed investors (VCs) in the market increases welfare by help-
ing entrepreneurs to oﬀer high-return projects (Chan, 1983). Indeed, the existing evidence
suggests that ﬁrms backed by VCs are more innovative, speed up the time to market, and
grow faster than their industry counterparts (Hellmann and Puri, 2000; Kortum and Lerner,
2000; Hirukawa and Ueda, 2003; Keuschnigg, 2002; OECD, 1996).
The VCs’ superior knowledge of particular industries also plays a certiﬁcation role for
1ﬁrms that decide to go public. The VCs can certify that the oﬀering price of the issue reﬂects
all available and relevant information (Megginson and Weiss, 1991). The existing evidence
also shows that the capital markets recognize the quality of VCs’ monitoring services by
requiring less underpricing for issues with higher quality VCs (Barry, Muscarella, Peavy III,
and Vetsuypens, 1990; Gompers, 1996), because experienced VCs successfully time initial
public oﬀerings: they are more likely to take companies public when their valuations are at
their absolute and short-run peaks (Lerner, 1994). Venture capital ﬁnancing also seems to
prevail in high-risk equilibria characterized by a high degree of uncertainty about project
quality, which exempliﬁes the advantage VCs have over banks, for example. Bank ﬁnanc-
ing, on the other hand, prevails in low-risk equilibria where there is little uncertainty about
project outcomes (Chan, 1983; Dietz, 2002; Bernhardt and Krasa, 2003; Landier, 2003).
While preferred equity is the optimal choice in the presence of high levels of uncertainty
regarding project quality (Trester, 1998), debt ﬁnancing is the optimal choice if the intel-
lectual property rights of the entrepreneur are not securely protected: the VC can steal the
entrepreneur’s idea, but the bank cannot (Ueda, 2004).1 At the same time, larger projects
tend to receive equity ﬁnancing, whereas smaller ones receive debt ﬁnancing (Ueda, 2004)
or angel ﬁnancing (Casamatta, 2002).
The evidence also shows that a large VC ﬁrm can receive up to 1,000 investment propos-
als each year, but it ends up ﬁnancing only about a dozen of them (Sahlman, 1990). This
indicates that experienced venture capital is scarce, possibly due to the slow entry of expe-
rienced VCs. Despite this phenomenon, the literature on venture capital ﬁnancing initially
developed using the assumption that any entrepreneur with a viable business idea meets a
VC who ﬁnances the entrepreneurs’ project.2 This stream of literature typically examines
the relationship between an entrepreneur—the agent—who has a high-risk business idea and
no funds and a VC—the principal—who can provide both funds and managerial advice in
exchange for a share of the entrepreneur’s proﬁts. This relationship is characterized by a
double moral-hazard problem, because neither the entrepreneur nor the VC can observe the
eﬀort/advice level of the other party. In equilibrium, the entrepreneur and the VC underin-
vest eﬀort and advice, respectively. Each of them would like to be the full residual claimant
1There is also a literature that suggests convertible shares are an eﬃcient way of dealing with information
asymmetries. See Dewatripont, Legros, and Matthews (2002).
2See, for example, Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2003a,b, 2004), and Kanniainen and Keuschnigg (2003).
2of proﬁts. Since each is entitled to only a share of proﬁts while bearing the full cost of eﬀort,
both parties underinvest. In the case where the VC is allowed to ﬁnance and advise more
than one entrepreneurial ﬁrm, there is a trade-oﬀ between the number of ﬁrms in the VC’s
portfolio and the extent of managerial advice oﬀered to each of the ﬁrms (Kanniainen and
Keuschnigg, 2003; Cumming, 2001). Taxes and subsidies play an important role in restoring
eﬃciency in these models. One additional drawback of the principal-agent approach is that
the VC has all the bargaining power, which implies that the VC gets all the rents. This is
no longer the case in our paper, where rents are shared between the entrepreneur and the
VC according to their bargaining power.
We assume in this paper that informed capital—that is, venture capital—is in limited
supply. Therefore, an entrepreneur who has a business idea but no funds may or may not ﬁnd
a VC to screen and invest in the project. To capture this idea, we employ a simple stylized
search model of venture capital where the number of successful matches of entrepreneurs and
VCs at any moment in time is a function of the number of entrepreneurs searching for funds,
the number of VCs searching for entrepreneurs, and the number of vacancies posted by each
VC.3 Our model is a static analogue to the usual dynamic search model, which simpliﬁes the
analysis considerably without sacriﬁcing the basic insight of search models.4 The model is
closest to Inderst and M¨ uller (2004), Michelacci and Suarez (2002), and Keuschnigg (2003),
who also consider search models of venture capital, although their focus is diﬀerent than
ours. Michelacci and Suarez (2002) develop a search model of venture capital and focus on
the relationship between informed capital and the decision of a ﬁrm to go public. A ﬁrm
that is matched with a VC has to decide at which stage to go public. In deciding when to
go public, young ﬁrms face a trade-oﬀ between the liquidity, diversiﬁcation, and recycling
gains of going public and the costs due to being listed before maturity. Firms go public
the sooner informed capital is “recycled” for the ﬁnancing of new ﬁrms. The equilibrium
is subject to the standard search ineﬃciencies identiﬁed by Hosios (1990), which depend on
the balance of bargaining power between the entrepreneur and the VC. If VCs’ bargaining
power dominates, this leads to ineﬃciently low entry into entrepreneurship and translates
into underdevelopment of the stock market, because not enough capital is made available
3See, for example, Pissarides (2000) for the standard labour market search model.
4See Johnson and Layard (1986) for the static search model. Boadway, Cuﬀ, and Marceau (2004) have
shown that the static model is analogous to the steady-state version of the dynamic model.
3for the ﬁnancing of new start-ups.
Keuschnigg (2003) provides a rich policy analysis of venture capital-backed entrepreneur-
ship using a search model of venture capital. In his paper, optimal policy consists of: (i)
subsidies to basic research spending, to reduce the entry costs of potential entrepreneurs;
(ii) output subsidies to successfully established ﬁrms, to correct for the externalities due to
monopolistic power of innovative ﬁrms; (iii) revenue subsidies to entrepreneurs and VCs, and
a tax on start-up investment spending, to address the underinvestment due to the double
moral hazard in the relationship between entrepreneurs and VCs; and (iv) an entry subsidy
either to entrepreneurs or to VCs, to correct for search externalities.
Inderst and M¨ uller (2004) provide a short- and long-run analysis of VC entry in a search
market. They, much like Keuschnigg (2003), identify ineﬃciencies due to search, and in-
eﬃciencies due to an imbalance in proﬁt sharing relative to the bargaining powers of en-
trepreneurs and VCs. Inderst and M¨ uller, however, do not derive the policy implications of
their model.
While the papers by Michelacci and Suarez (2002), Keuschnigg (2003), and Inderst and
M¨ uller (2004) model a search environment for venture capital, they do not explore the
implications of imperfect matching for the level of employment and the level of frictional
unemployment. These are important issues in the debate on the role of government’s in-
volvement in providing incentives for entrepreneurial activity. The rationale for government
intervention is that entrepreneurship has been identiﬁed as a key component in an economy’s
ability to grow and alleviate high unemployment. Our paper extends the literature on en-
trepreneurship in three ways. First, it includes search unemployment. Second, it explicitly
models the occupational choice of individuals to become workers or entrepreneurs. Third,
it models the more realistic setting wherein entrepreneurs do not have an informational
advantage over VCs regarding a project’s probability of success. This setting explicitly in-
corporates the role of VCs as informed investors who have superior knowledge of a particular
industry and have superior screening skills. These qualities provide an important motivation
for potential entrepreneurs to engage a VC. Optimal policy in our model involves correcting
for ineﬃciencies created by entrepreneurs’ employment decisions, VCs’ decisions in providing
advice and choosing the number of vacancies, and the occupational choices of individuals to
become workers or entrepreneurs.
4The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. In
sections 2.1 and 2.2, we analyze the entrepreneur’s and VC’s problems, respectively. In
section 2.3, we examine the Nash bargaining problem between the entrepreneur and the VC.
In section 2.4, we consider the number of vacancies created by a VC, and in section 2.5 we
analyze individuals’ decisions to enter entrepreneurship. We examine the social optimum in
section 3 and government policies to achieve it in section 4. Section 5 oﬀers some conclusions.
2 The Model
The economy comprises F VCs and I individuals. Both F and I are ﬁxed, and I is a large
number. Individuals can become entrepreneurs, workers, or unemployed. Entrepreneurs
have no initial wealth; if they become entrepreneurs, they need external ﬁnancing to start a
project. The project requires an initial investment, k. A VC provides the initial investment
and business advice in exchange for a share, α, of the new business’ proﬁts. As workers,
individuals are identical, but if an individual becomes an entrepreneur, then the individual is
one of two types, 1 or 2, that diﬀers according to the project’s probability of success. There
are a ﬁxed proportion, z, of type 2 individuals. Projects undertaken by type 1 entrepreneurs
are assumed, for simplicity, to have zero probability of success. The probability of success
of a type 2’s project, p, depends on the managerial advice provided by the VC, a; that is,
p = p(a), and is increasing and concave. Advice is critical for the success of the project,
and thus p(0) = 0. If successful, the entrepreneur of type 2 employs labour according to the
production technology, f(`), with f0(·) > 0 and f00(·) < 0, and workers are paid the wage w.
Projects that are unsuccessful produce no output for simplicity, and their workers receive no
wages.
An important assumption of the model is that individuals do not know their type prior
to making their occupational choice. This assumption captures the notion that the VC has
superior knowledge of the industry, and that as a result the entrepreneur engages a VC to
screen a project in order to determine whether it is worthwhile. In this setting, we denote
by P the number of the I individuals who decide to become potential entrepreneurs. VC
ﬁnancing is scarce, and so not all potential entrepreneurs are “matched” with a VC. We
denote by v the “vacancy” rate of ﬁnanciers. Creating a vacancy is costly, because it entails
the screening of potential entrepreneurs. The screening process is assumed to be perfect,
5and so only potential entrepreneurs of type 2 are taken on by the VC. Costly screening thus
creates frictions in the VC market, and these frictions are captured by a matching function,
x(P,vF), which is increasing, concave, continuously diﬀerentiable in both arguments, and
homogeneous of degree one (constant returns to scale). The matching function gives the
number of matchings that results per unit time.










θ = P/vF (2)
is a measure of the scarcity of the venture capital. Similarly, the probability that a potential















We denote the elasticity of q(θ) by η(θ). By the properties of the matching function, q0(θ) > 0
and 0 6 η(θ) 6 1.
The VC incurs three separate costs. The ﬁrst is the cost of creating a vacancy, δ, asso-
ciated with the screening of projects, and is increasing and strictly convex in the number of
vacancies that are successfully matched and screened; that is, δ0(q(θ)v) > 0 and δ00(·) > 0.
The VC also incurs a cost when advising a type 2 entrepreneur. A linear advice cost function,
ga, is assumed for simplicity. Note that advice is private information and is non-veriﬁable,
so it cannot be contracted upon. Proﬁts, however, are observable ex post. The ﬁnal cost is
the ﬁnancing cost of the initial investment, k, at the exogenous interest rate, r.
In the market equilibrium, the sequence of events is as follows:
• Stage 1: Occupational choice – Individuals choose whether to become potential en-
trepreneurs or workers.
• Stage 2: Matching and screening – VCs choose the number of vacancies. Venture
capitalists and potential entrepreneurs get matched according to a matching function
and screening takes place. Potential entrepreneurs who do not ﬁnd a match and those
who do ﬁnd a match, but are screened to be of type 1, become unemployed.
6• Stage 3: Bargaining – Following a successful match and screening, the VC and the
entrepreneur bargain over the division of proﬁts.
• Stage 4: Choice of advice – The VC chooses the level of managerial advice.
• Stage 5: Hiring – The success of the projects is revealed and entrepreneurs hire labour.
The equilibrium concept we use for solving this game is that of subgame perfection.
Therefore, we begin by ﬁrst solving for stage 5.
2.1 Stage 5: The entrepreneur’s choice of labour
In the ﬁnal stage of the game, recall that only type 2 entrepreneurs have survived the screen-
ing process. We assume that if entrepreneurs are not successful, they become unemployed
and receive zero revenues. In this case, their workers are laid oﬀ and receive no pay. At
this stage, a, α, w, v, and θ have been determined in the previous stages. A representative
entrepreneur of type 2 chooses labour to maximize expected proﬁts. Recall that, with prob-
ability p, the project is successful and the entrepreneur obtains a share (1 − α) of proﬁts.
With probability (1 − p) the project fails and the entrepreneur receives zero revenues.5 The
entrepreneur’s problem in selecting labour is to:
max
`
(1 − α)p(a)[f(`) − w`]. (4)
The solution to the entrepreneur’s problem solves the ﬁrst-order condition:
f
0(`) = w. (5)
That is, workers are paid the marginal product of labour. Condition (5) determines `(w),
with (∂`/∂w) < 0, as expected. Substituting `(w) into the entrepreneur’s objective function
deﬁnes the proﬁt function, πE(a,w,α).6
5Allowing individuals to receive an exogenous outside income in the event of failure does not alter our
results. Consequently, to simplify the notation, we assume that individuals earn zero income if entrepreneurs
are unsuccessful.
6The properties of πE(·) are provided in Appendix A.
72.2 Stage 4: The VC’s choice of advice
At this stage, the VC chooses the amount of advice, a, for each of the entrepreneurs in
their portfolio to maximize proﬁts, taking α, w, v, and θ as given. Given the homogeneity
of type 2 entrepreneurs, we know that the equilibrium involves the symmetric treatment of
all entrepreneurs taken on by the VC. Furthermore, the assumption of a linear advice cost
function implies that we can examine the VC’s choice of advice for a representative type 2
entrepreneur. The VC’s problem is therefore to:
max
a
αp(a)(f(`) − w`) − (1 + r)k − ga − δ(q(θ)v). (6)
The ﬁrst-order condition,
αp
0(a)(f(`) − w`) − g = 0, (7)
determines the optimal advice function, a(α,w).7 The second-order condition for a maximum
D = αp
00(a)(f(`) − w`) < 0 (8)
is satisﬁed. Substituting a(α,w) into the VC’s objective function deﬁnes the proﬁt function,
πV(α,w,v,k,θ), for a representative project.
Proposition 1 The optimal advice function, a(α,w), is increasing in α and decreasing in
w.













The intuition for Proposition 1 is straightforward. A higher share of proﬁts provides the
VC with incentives to supply more advice. Higher wages reduce the VC’s payoﬀ and, thus,
the VC’s incentives to supply advice.
7The comparative statics properties are provided in Appendix A.
82.3 Stage 3: Nash bargaining
At this stage, the VC bargains individually with each entrepreneur, given w, v, and θ.
The VC and the entrepreneur anticipate a(α,w) and `(w) determined at stages 4 and 5,








where πE is determined in stage 5 and πV is determined in stage 4. The entrepreneurs’
bargaining power is denoted by β ∈ (0,1). The threatpoint for the entrepreneur is zero
because the entrepreneur obtains zero proﬁts in the event that bargaining with the VC is
unsuccessful. The threatpoint for the VC is the initial investment, k, because the VC gets to
keep the initial investment in the event that bargaining with the entrepreneur is unsuccessful.
The optimal equity share, α(w,v,θ), solves the following ﬁrst-order condition8:
π
E = βΦ + β[π
V − k](1 − α)
(p0)2
αp00 , (12)
where Φ ≡ πE +πV −k is the total surplus to be divided between the entrepreneur and the
VC. Equation (12) determines the proﬁt-sharing rule, the comparative statics properties of
which are ambiguous. The second term in (12) is negative by the properties of the probability
function p(a), which gives rise to the following proposition:
Proposition 2 In equilibrium, the entrepreneur obtains a share of the surplus that is smaller
than their bargaining power, β.
The reasoning behind this proposition is straightforward. From (9), providing the VC
with a larger share of the surplus induces an increase in the VC’s provision of advice, which
beneﬁts both the VC and the entrepreneur. Thus, the entrepreneur is willing to accept a
smaller share of the surplus, because doing so increases the expected size of the surplus.
2.4 Stage 2: Choice of vacancies
The VC chooses the number of vacancies so as to maximize expected proﬁts, taking as given
θ and w and anticipating a(α,w), `(w), and α(w,v,θ), which are determined at the later
8The proof is provided in Appendix B.
9stages. The VC’s problem is to:
max
v
q(θ)v(1 − z)[αp(a)(f(`) − w`) − ga − (1 + r)k] − δ(q(θ)v). (13)
The optimal number of vacancies, v(w,θ), solves the ﬁrst-order condition:




0 = 0. (14)
The comparative statics properties of v(w,θ) are ambiguous.
2.5 Stage 1: Occupational choice
Individuals choose whether to become workers or entrepreneurs by comparing the expected
payoﬀs in each situation. In doing so, individuals anticipate `(w), a(α,w), α(w,v,θ), and
v(w,θ), determined at later stages. An individual who decides to become a worker obtains
wages, w, with probability p. An individual who decides to become an entrepreneur obtains
proﬁts, πE, provided that the individual obtains a match with a VC and is screened to
be of type 2. In equilibrium, an individual is indiﬀerent between becoming a worker or







Equation (15) determines the wage rate, w(θ), which can be either increasing or decreasing
in θ.
2.6 The market equilibrium
Solving stages 1 through 5 backwards provides the recursive solution for the market equi-
librium values of `, a, α, v, and w as functions of θ. If we denote by E the total number
of entrepreneurs, E must be equal to the number of VCs times the number of vacancies
screened and ﬁlled by each VC:
E = (1 − z)q(θ)Fv. (16)
Furthermore, equilibrium in the labour market requires that individuals become either en-
trepreneurs or workers:
P + `E = I. (17)
10Equations (16) and (17), and the deﬁnition of θ given in (2), determine the market equilib-
rium values for θ, E, and P.
2.7 Unemployment
We denote by ˆ U the number of ex ante unemployed. We deﬁne ex ante unemployment
as the level of unemployment before it becomes known which entrepreneurs’ projects are
successful. Ex ante unemployment therefore results only from matching frictions in the
market for venture capital. Since the total number of potential entrepreneurs, P, is equal to
the total number of entrepreneurs, E, plus the number of unemployed, ˆ U, it follows that
ˆ U = P − E. (18)
Ex post unemployment, on the other hand, also includes workers and entrepreneurs who
become unemployed due to the failure of entrepreneurs’ projects. If we denote ex post
unemployment by U, the number of ex post unemployed is given by:
U = ˆ U + (1 − p)(1 + `)E. (19)
3 The Social Optimum
Since all agents are risk-neutral and care only about expected income, we can abstract from
redistributive motives and treat aggregate output or GDP as an index of social welfare. GDP
is given by:
Y = F{(1 − z)q(θ)v[p(a)f(`) − ga − (1 + r)k] − δ(q(θ)v)}. (20)
The social optimum is said to be constrained Pareto eﬃcient when `, a, and v maximize
GDP subject to (16), (17), and (2). From (17), the optimal choices of ` and v determine the
optimal division of individuals between entrepreneurs and workers. That is, (17) determines
the optimal number of potential entrepreneurs, P.
For the social optimum, equations (16), (17), and (2) can be solved for the scarcity of










θ + (1 − z)q(θ)`
∆
< 0, (22)
where ∆ = Fv{1 + `(1 − z)q0(θ)} > 0. The intuition for these properties is as follows.
Equation (21) shows that an increase in the number of workers, `, by reducing the number
of potential entrepreneurs makes venture capital less scarce. Equation (22) shows the eﬀect
of an increase in the number of vacancies on θ. An increase in v increases the fraction of
entrepreneurs who fail each period, and decreases the number of potential entrepreneurs who
ﬁnd a match each period. Venture capital becomes less scarce as a result.
The planner’s problem can be treated as an unconstrained one by using the function
θ(`,v) obtained above from (16), (17), and (2). For this problem, the ﬁrst-order conditions
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where Ψ = p(a)f(`) − ga − (1 + r)k. These ﬁrst-order conditions determine the socially
optimal values `∗, a∗, and v∗. Then, from (16) and (17), we obtain the optimal number of
potential entrepreneurs P ∗, and, from (18) and (19), we obtain the optimal levels of ex ante
and ex post unemployment.
A comparison of the ﬁrst-order conditions for the social optimum with those of the no-
intervention or laissez-faire market equilibrium given in (5), (7), and (14) gives rise to the
following proposition:
Proposition 3 Employment, advice, the number of vacancies, the supply of entrepreneur-
ship, and unemployment in the laissez-faire market equilibrium are ineﬃcient.
To see this, we evaluate the derivatives of GDP with respect to `, a, and v given in (23),
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Equation (26) reﬂects the eﬀect of an increase in `, starting from the market equilibrium, on
social welfare. Beginning with the market’s selection of employment, entrepreneurs choose
labour to maximize their own proﬁts, taking the wage as a cost and ignoring the eﬀects
of their choice of employment on workers’ welfare and total expected output via the cost
of additional vacancies of VCs. The ﬁrst eﬀect is positive; that is, an increase in the level
of employment increases workers’ welfare and total output. The latter eﬀect is a match-
ing externality, in that an increase in employment, by reducing the number of potential
entrepreneurs, decreases the scarcity of venture capital. In equilibrium, the VCs respond
by increasing vacancies. The second term in (26) is, thus, negative. The total eﬀect of an
increase in ` on social welfare is, as a consequence, ambiguous. If the eﬀect of an increase in
` on workers’ welfare dominates the matching externality eﬀect, the right-hand side of (26) is
positive. That is, an increase in ` increases welfare and the employment level is ineﬃciently
low compared with the social optimum. The reverse is true if the matching externality eﬀect
dominates. The employment level is, thus, ineﬃciently low or high, depending on which
eﬀect dominates.
Equation (27) shows the eﬀect of an increase in the level of advice, starting from the
market equilibrium, on social welfare. The VCs’ choice of advice considers only their own
share of proﬁts, which includes labour costs, and is thus ineﬃciently low compared with the
social optimum. An increase in the level of advice above the market equilibrium increases
welfare.
Equation (28) reﬂects the eﬀect of an increase in the number of vacancies, starting from
the market equilibrium, on social welfare. The VCs select the number of vacancies by taking
into account the eﬀect of v on their own proﬁts and ignoring the eﬀect on the entrepreneurs’
share of proﬁts and on the cost of additional vacancies of all VCs. The latter is a matching
externality, in that an increase in v increases vacancies by (i) increasing the ﬂow out of
entrepreneurship, and (ii) decreasing the scarcity of venture capital.
Given that ` and v are ineﬃcient in the market equilibrium, so too are P(= I −`E) and
E = (1 − z)q(θ)Fv. In particular, the number of potential and actual entrepreneurs may be
13ineﬃciently low or high, depending on the magnitudes of the various externalities described
above. Similarly, given that `, E, and P are ineﬃcient in the market equilibrium, the levels
of ex ante and ex post unemployment deﬁned in (18) and (19) are also ineﬃcient. Thus,
unemployment as well may be too high or too low in the market equilibrium, compared with
the social optimum.
4 Optimal Policy
The social optimum can be achieved in the decentralized market setting if the government
has at its disposal an appropriate set of policy instruments. The set we consider comprises
an employment tax, τ, levied on entrepreneurs; a capital gains tax, t, levied on VCs; and
an investment tax, σ, levied on VCs. An optimal policy must be such that the ﬁrst-order
conditions for `, a, and v for the market are equivalent to the ﬁrst-order conditions for
the social optimum given by (23), (24), and (25). Note that for `, a, and v to be chosen
optimally, the tax rates must be chosen such that the Nash bargaining solution determines the
“optimal” division of proﬁts and the occupational choice condition determines the “optimal”
wage rate; that is, the wage at which the optimal number of individuals choose to enter the
entrepreneurship lottery.
With the set of policy instruments deﬁned above, entrepreneurs’ proﬁts are written as:
(1 − α)p(a)[f(`) − (w + τ)`]. (29)
Similarly, a VC’s expected proﬁts before screening has taken place can be written as:
q(θ)(1 − z)
©
(1 − t)[αp(a)(f(`) − w`) − (1 + r + σ)k] − ga
ª
δ(q(θ)v). (30)
With the inclusion of taxes, the market ﬁrst-order conditions for the selection of `, a,
and v are given by:
f
0(`) = w + τ, (31)
(1 − t)αp







A comparison of the ﬁrst-order conditions (23), (24), and (25) with (31), (32), and (33)
yields the results for optimal policy described in sections 4.1–4.3.
144.1 Employment taxes
Proposition 4 The optimal employment tax is given by:
τ




















Intuitively, the employment tax is chosen so as to internalize the externalities caused
by the entrepreneurs choosing the employment level without taking into account the eﬀect
of their choice on the total expected output and the cost of additional vacancies of VCs.
The ﬁrst term in (34) is of ambiguous sign and the second term is positive according to
(21). Since the expression on the right-hand side of (34) is of ambiguous sign, it follows
that the government can tax or subsidize employment to achieve the social optimum. The
government chooses to tax/subsidize employment such that the optimal tax/subsidy closes















4.2 Capital gains taxes
Proposition 5 The optimal capital gains tax is negative and given by:
t




The intuition for Proposition 5 is straightforward. In the market equilibrium, VCs provide
a level of advice that is too low compared with the social optimum. In order to induce a
higher level of advice, it is optimal for the governement to subsidize capital gains. It is
straightforward to show that the optimal capital gains subsidy closes the gap between the































































As expected, the optimal investment tax can be negative or positive. The government
chooses the optimal investment tax in order for VCs to internalize the externalities that arise
from their choice of vacancies. Thus, the optimal investment tax closes the gap between the


















From our discussion in the previous section, the optimal tax rates correct for the fact
that both entrepreneurs and venture capitalists (i) do not take into account their choices
on expected total output, (ii) include the wage as a cost, and (iii) do not take into account
the matching externalities. We showed in the previous section that the level of advice in
the market equilibrium is too low relative to the social optimum. Optimal policy therefore
involves a capital gains subsidy (i.e., t∗ < 0). The signs of the optimal employment tax
and investment tax depend on the relative strengths of these three factors. Thus, it may be
optimal to tax or subsidize employment and investment.
The set of three policy instruments we considered are suﬃcient to restore the ineﬃcien-
cies arising in the market equilibrium. With the employment tax, capital gains tax, and the
investment tax chosen optimally, the levels of employment, advice, and the number of vacan-
cies become eﬃcient. As a result, the number of entrepreneurs and potential entrepreneurs,
and the levels of ex ante and ex post unemployment, are all eﬃcient.
165 Conclusions
In this paper, we have developed a matching model of venture capital and entrepreneurship to
capture the idea that informed capital is scarce. This is in contrast with the standard model
of venture capital, which considers an isolated setting with one VC and one entrepreneur.
In a matching model, the number of successful matches of entrepreneurs and VCs at any
moment in time is a function of the number of entrepreneurs looking for funds, the number of
VCs looking for entrepreneurs, and the number of vacancies posted by each VC. One feature
that distinguishes our model from other venture capital search models is that we explicitly
model individuals’ decisions to become potential entrepreneurs versus workers in a setting
where they have no prior knowledge of their innate ability to succeed as entrepreneurs. An
individual who decides to become a potential entrepreneur forgoes wage income and faces
the risk of not being matched with a VC, in which case the individual becomes unemployed.
A potential entrepreneur becomes an entrepreneur only if they ﬁnd a match and their project
is screened to be worthwhile. The project’s probability of success depends on the level of
advice provided by the VC. If the entrepreneur’s project fails, the entrepreneur becomes
unemployed and receives no income. This set-up allows us to generate unemployment in the
model and examine the implications of imperfect matching for the level of employment and
the level of frictional unemployment.
Our analysis shows that, in the market equilibrium, the level of advice provided by the VC
is ineﬃciently low compared with the social optimum, because the VC considers only their
own share of proﬁts when selecting the level of advice. At the same time, the VC’s portfolio
size is ineﬃcient from a social viewpoint, because the VC ignores the additional eﬀort cost
on the part of entrepreneurs and on the cost of additional vacancies of all VCs (the matching
externality). These two eﬀects work in opposite directions, and therefore the size of the
portfolio in the market equilibrium can be ineﬃciently low or high. The entrepreneur’s choice
of employment is also ineﬃciently low or high in the market equilibrium. The entrepreneur
maximizes their own proﬁts, and thus ignores the eﬀect of their choice of employment on
total expected output and on the cost of additional vacancies of all VCs. This implies that
the number of potential entrepreneurs and the levels of ex ante and ex post unemployment
are also ineﬃcient.
The optimal policy to achieve the social optimum consists of: (i) a negative capital gains
17“tax” to achieve the socially optimal level of advice, (ii) an employment tax (or subsidy) on
entrepreneurs to achieve the socially optimal level of employment, and (iii) an investment tax
(or subsidy) to achieve the socially optimal number of vacancies. The optimal employment
and investment taxes (or subsidies) ensure that the number of potential entrepreneurs, ex
ante and ex post unemployment, are restored to their eﬃcient levels.
One simpliﬁcation of our model is the assumption that only type 2 entrepreneurs’ projects
have any probability of success. An interesting extension would be to allow more than one
type of entrepreneur to be taken on by the VC. In such a setting, tax policy could result in
shifts in the types of entrepreneurs that would receive VC ﬁnancing. A further simpliﬁcation
of our model is that entrepreneurs seek ﬁnancing only from VCs. An interesting extension
would be to allow entrepreneurs access to both venture capital and bank ﬁnancing. Such
an analysis could provide a more interesting environment for screening undertaken by VCs.
In particular, a diﬀerent form of externality in addition to the search externalities identiﬁed
in this paper could arise if banks could free ride on screening undertaken by VCs and oﬀer
entrepreneurs better ﬁnancing terms that might entice them away from a VC. Incorporating
both VC and bank ﬁnancing into our model could also help identify factors that make VC
ﬁnancing more attractive than bank ﬁnancing.
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21Appendices
A Stages 4 and 5: Comparative Statics
The Envelope Theorem gives the properties of the entrepreneur’s expected proﬁt function,




0(1 − α)(f(`) − w`) > 0; (A.1)
∂πE
∂w
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0 < 0; (A.7)
∂πV
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= −(1 + r) < 0. (A.8)
22B Proof of Equation (12)










E = (1 − α)p(a)(f(`) − w`), (B.2)
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V = αp(a)(f(`) − w`) − (1 + r)k − ga − δ(q(θ)v), (B.3)
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= p(a)(f(`) − w`). (B.6)
Gathering like terms, the ﬁrst-order condition can be written as (12).
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